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The Wages of fear:
risk, safety and 
undocumented work
1We are the precarious, the flexible, the temporary, the mobile. We’re the people that 
live on a tightrope, in a precarious balance, we’re the restructured and outsourced, 
those who lack a stable job, and those who are overexploited; those who pay a 
mortgage or a rent that strangles us. We’re forced to buy and sell our ability to love 
and care. We’re just like you: contortionists of flexibility (Manifiesto Convocatoria 
Barcelona ‘Forum 2004’ – cited in Raunig, 2004).
Jon Burnett and David Whyte
The Wages of fear:
risk, safety and 
undocumented work
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‘I have a family and if I have a choice between working illegally or starving my family 
I will work illegal ... I will never let my family starve.’
These are the words of one of the so-called ‘failed’ asylum seekers interviewed in this 
report.  Their ‘failed’ status comes from rejected asylum claims which are more often 
than not the consequences of inhumane asylum laws in the UK. 
‘The Wages of Fear: risk, safety and undocumented work’ is an extremely important 
contribution to the research on the experiences of undocumented migrant workers 
in the UK, of which there is little. These undocumented migrant workers are the 
lifeblood of the UK economy doing the work that others are unwilling to undertake. 
Those interviewed are destitute after financial support has been withdrawn or are on 
very basic levels of support. They are in limbo – unable to return to their countries of 
origin for a variety of reasons yet barely able to subsist here.
Jon Burnett and David Whyte expose the institutionalised exploitation of the 
undocumented and their powerlessness to improve their working conditions or 
pay. As the report states, too little is known about what happens to people who are 
forced to work clandestinely/illegally in order to survive and eke out the most basic 
existence in the UK. Those interviewed here in one northern city provide a snapshot 
of what is without doubt being replicated across the UK, in factories, takeaways, 
shops, the construction industry and other places where the undocumented can find 
work. The work is often dangerous, unregulated and very poorly paid. 
There is little support available for such workers. They cannot complain if they are 
badly treated, overworked or underpaid. This is a form of modern day slavery.  These 
are people who are failed repeatedly by a state that cares for nothing other than 
feeding the economy with cheap labour – no matter what the human cost. 
The experiences of the undocumented, who are the most vulnerable in our society 
and in most need of protection, should be a lesson to us all. 
Harmit Athwal
Editor – IRR Race & Refugee News Service 
www.irr.org.uk
contentsPreface
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introduction
the wages of fear: risk, safety and undocumented work
The Conservatives took power in 2010 with a pledge to dramatically reduce non- 
EU migration. However, Prime Minister David Cameron’s determination to impose 
tough immigration caps has met resistance from some Liberal Democrats in his 
cabinet. Business Secretary Vince Cable has warned of the ‘very damaging’ impact 
of immigration caps on the economy. This is a view that is increasingly supported 
by key business leaders (Ahmed, 2010). In public, this debate appears to present an 
over-simplified, bi-polar, choice between populism and free-market pragmatism. The 
reality of British government policy is that it is shaped by both.
Governments have for some years been the architects of a strategy of “managed 
migration.”  As the Home Office notes:
Immigration has contributed to the success of the UK economy… our job now
is to make sure migration does even more to profit Britain, economically and
culturally (Home Office, 2008a). 
Migrant workers are increasingly recruited to do the dirtiest and least protected jobs. 
In the past two decades, migration policy has been reshaped to address the needs 
of labour markets more directly. The strategy of managed migration is ostensibly 
aimed at regulating flows of people into the UK by seeking to match human capital 
to labour shortages and requirements. This strategy represents a conjoining of labour 
and immigration policy through which the purpose is both to draw in, and expel 
migrants as and when required (Kundnani, 2007a: 143-147). As such, the aim is to 
enable routes into the country to be turned on and off with little notice, and little 
consultation. They can be closed down in order to maximise political capital or as a 
reactive response to moral panics around immigration as well as a response to labour 
market demands.  This generation of politicians are by no means the first to exploit 
the issue of immigration in this way, and they are unlikely to be the last.1
Reworking the fortress Europe policies of the 1990s, the development of a framework 
of managed migration is indicative of an emerging global architecture with ever more 
punitive outcomes. For at the same time as mechanisms are put in place to funnel 
and order migration according to specific needs and desires, these same instruments 
underpin new and emerging measures of expulsion and criminalisation. In June 
2008 this was made acutely visible when the European Parliament passed a set of 
1 In January/February 2009 workers at the Lindsey Oil Refinery in North Lincolnshire and several other 
energy industry sites across the UK organised protests and industrial action against the employment of 
regular foreign workers. Former Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s slogan, ‘British Jobs for British Workers’ 
took on a popular significance and appeared frequently in news media-reported crowd scenes during 
those disputes. On the 4th February 2009, responding to criticisms of his inflammatory language during 
Prime Ministers Question Time, Gordon Brown asked: ‘Can anybody here say that they don’t want British 
workers to get jobs in our country?’
8 9
introDuction introDuction
reforms that allows a period of 18 months of summary imprisonment of ‘irregular 
migrants’ combined with a five year ban on re-entry (Burnett, 2008: 26). 
These strategies, as we indicate above, are often politically driven. For whilst 
irregular migration is made the target of a concerted set of policies and directives 
aimed at control, expulsion, and management, it is important to note that it is these 
same mechanisms that establish what counts as ‘regularity’ and ‘irregularity’ in the 
first place. There are no valid estimates of the number of irregular migrants in the 
world, but there are many indicators to suggest that their number is increasing. The 
International Labour Organization (ILO, 2004) suggests that up to 15% of migrants 
are ‘irregular’. And whereas in 1960 there were over 75 million people who were 
classed by the United Nations as ‘international migrants’, by 2005 this number had 
increased to 190 million (United Nations, 2006). Using the ILO estimate, this would 
suggest that, in 2005, there were up to 30 million irregular migrants across the 
globe. In the same year, within the UK, Home Office research suggested that irregular 
migrants made up to a maximum of one in every 100 hundred of the population 
(Branigan, 2005: 1). Whilst, in 2009, research published by the Greater London 
Authority estimated that approximately 618,000 irregular migrants live in the UK 
(Gordon et al, 2009). 
The report that follows focuses on one small sub-category of this section of the 
populace. It is based on detailed interviews with fourteen people2  who are all seeking 
asylum but, having had their claims refused, are left in a form of limbo. Refused 
asylum seekers3  are not allowed to work, have no access to housing, little access 
to statutory services, and in many cases little optimism for what the future holds. 
Some of the people interviewed here have been destitute for years. Some of them 
have experienced destitution, but at the time of writing are receiving some form 
of support as a result of fresh evidence having been submitted to the Home Office 
regarding their claim for asylum. But all of them share one thing in common in that, 
regardless of what the government has ruled in relation to their asylum claim, they 
are too afraid to return home to face violence, torture, and potentially death. As 
such, in an attempt to eke out an existence, they have entered the labour market as 
undocumented workers. 
2 Details of who those people are and how they were identified are included in Appendix 1 of this report.
3  Before their claim has been decided asylum seekers are not allowed to work, and normally receive 
entitlements in the form of accommodation and cash support set at 70% of income support. If an asylum 
claim is refused all support is withdrawn from the individual after 21 days. With no right to work, 
no access to accommodation, and no welfare entitlements, refused asylum seekers are pushed into 
destitution.  The immigration status of respondents at the time of interview may not have been the same 
as when the respondent was working. Some respondents, for example, worked only when they had all 
of their financial support removed after their claim for asylum was refused. 
This report presents a study of precarious working conditions experienced by 
undocumented workers, and as such, it documents the harms that undocumented 
workers suffer and witness. It begins by exploring the importance of notions 
of labour market flexibility and flexicurity in government and trans-national 
government policy making. It argues that the exploitation of migrant workers and 
undocumented workers is structured by these labour market conditions. Second, it 
utilises the interview data to consider in detail this structural subordination, arguing 
that, combined with the at times contradictory imperatives of immigration policy, 
the precariousness of undocumented workers acts as a disciplinary tool. Finally it 
indicates that, in this context, the occupational risks to which undocumented workers 
are exposed need to be understood in terms of the highly dangerous and violent 
consequences experienced by those workers.
This report will describe how employers exploit undocumented workers in some of 
the dirtiest, most dangerous jobs as a matter of routine, and how they pay poverty 
wages for backbreaking work. They force long hours when needed, and summary 
dismissals when not. They coerce injured workers to carry on working and they fire 
those whose injuries are so bad that they cannot continue to work.  With their very 
presence in the country criminalised, workers are much less able to formally organise 
themselves or join a trade union; they are less able to seek redress if and when they 
are abused; and are hesitant to seek medical assistance, sometimes after serious 
injuries.  
Of the fourteen interviewees, not all were in employment at the time of their 
interview, but they may well be at the time of writing. As we shall see, undocumented 
labour is marked by periods of both frequent inactivity and frenetic intensity. These 
undocumented cleaners, labourers, car-washers, cashiers, factory workers, kitchen 
porters, and drivers are permanently available. They have to be. For when work is 
presented it offers an opportunity to secure a tentative foothold on the margins of 
society. If wages are paid – and as we shall see this is by no means a certainty – then 
the money that is earned offers a chance, for a short time at least, to be able to buy 
food, to pay rent, and if possible to support loved ones who have had to be left at 
home. Almost all of those interviewed have had to sleep on the streets at one point 
or another since arriving in the UK. Many of them will have to again. Working, often 
any work, is the only safeguard they have. Thus all of those interviewed have had 
numerous jobs, sometimes for a few days, sometimes for a few months - but always 
in conditions that are insecure, exploitative, and more often than not unsafe. 
The dangers that workers face in this report raises are not solely the fault of nasty or 
rogue employers; the risks faced by workers are not created by immoral employers 
or ‘gangmasters’.  The exploitative and often violent qualities of employers are 
much less significant than the fact that the interstices of a socio-economic context 
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and a consciously constructed labour market segment systematically produce the 
experiences that are documented here. 
This report begins to unravel a story that is normally only told in the context of 
catastrophic events such as the Morecambe Bay disaster.4 But what follows provides 
a more mundane way of interpreting the dangers that migrant workers face.  For, as 
the data analysed here reveals, those risks are everyday, routine, and in many ways 
part of the normalised experience of undocumented workers in the UK. 
4 On 5th February 2004, 23 cockle pickers were drowned at Morecambe Bay on the Lancashire coast. 
This was the worst single industrial disaster in Britain since Piper Alpha.  The dead were all irregular 
migrant workers from China who had been put to work on the highly profitable cockle beds of the Fylde 
coast (see Tombs and Whyte, 2007).
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the neW Flexicurity
The introduction of ‘flexibility’ into the labour market has been a feature of successive 
UK governments since the 1970s (Monastiriotis, 2006: 9-10) and has been proposed 
as a means of delivering competitiveness in a globalised economy (HM Treasury, 
2005). The growth in the informal economy that has occurred in recent years is tied 
to the UK governments demand for flexible labour markets (Castles, 2006: 745). 
Thus:  
[G]reater flexibility means that firms are able to adjust prices, output, employment 
and investment more quickly in response to shocks and changes in macroeconomic 
policy. (HM Treasury, 2005: Para 2.10)  
Government ministers have consistently argued that the provision of minimum 
employment standards that are sensitive to business conditions is a precursor to 
attracting foreign direct investment (for example, McFadden, 2007).  The new 
Government’s coalition agreement commits it to extending the “right” to flexible 
working to all employees (Hansard, 3rd June 2010 : Column 558). Thus, flexibility 
often translates in real terms as exemptions from working conditions such as 
guaranteed minimum working hours, paid leave and so on.  Flexibility, from the 
current government’s perspective, is seen as a way of guarding against the loss of 
autonomy implied by the globalisation of markets.  Flexibilisation has under this 
government been a key plank of welfare reform and has been seen as central to the 
development of a broader set of welfare-to-work policies (Peck and Theodore, 2000 
and 2001). 
To a greater or lesser extent, flexible working has been adopted by all EU member 
nations.  According to the Flexible Working Survey 2007, based on interviews across 
Europe, flexible working practices have been introduced at such a pace that they are 
now considered the norm (Puybaraud, 2007).  In January 2008 IDC, a subsidiary of 
the transnational global technology company IDG (the International Data Group), 
estimated that by 2011 up to one billion people across the world will be classed 
as ‘mobile workers’ (IDC, 2008: 1). As a major employer of such workers, the IDC 
welcomed this prospect, since organisations that deploy ‘mobile solutions...enjoy a 
strategic competitive advantage over their competitors who have not invested in 
integrating mobility into their cultural roadmap’ (ibid). ‘Flexibilisation’ is therefore 
seen as an essential response to global economic conditions.  Moreover, it is often 
presented as mutually advantageous for both employers and employees.  Claims 
supporting this consensus are based on the promise that flexibilisation can be: 
[B]eneficial both to employers who need to adapt to changing technologies and 
turbulent markets, and to employees who want to bring their working career in 
line with the requirements of their private life (Bijwaard and Veenman, 2008: 1). 
The idea of a common interest between employers and employees around 
flexibilisation is therefore based upon an acceptance and embracing of economic 
vulnerability on one hand (to meet employers’ needs) and increasingly temporal 
and ever-changing life-style demands experienced by individuals (which means 
that workers also require, and benefit from, flexibility) on the other.  The latter 
point is also often supported by claims in relation to the end of the predominance of 
traditional family structures, giving rise to a demand for non-standard shift patterns, 
new forms of homeworking and so on.  In other words, the consensus position 
on flexibilisation is based on the idea that both employers and employees require 
more flexible working as a result of changes in social patterns of organisation.  The 
emergence of flexibilisation to meet those demands is necessary to ensure that both 
employers and employees are not left behind by the new economy. 
This ‘common interest’ claim around flexibilisation is the one that dominates in 
government and trans-national government agendas, and is quickly becoming an 
orthodoxy in the political statements of both national and trans-national government. 
The idea is a central component of the economic strategy of the European Union. 
The EU Lisbon Strategy – introduced in 2000 and re-launched in 2005 – based a 
vision of economic growth partly upon ‘flexible management of working time and job 
rotation’ (European Council, 2000: para 29).  The term ‘flexicurity’ is used frequently 
in European Union policy documents to capture the idea of a common interest 
between employers and employees in the new economy (for example, European 
Commission, 2007).   
Migrant Work as Precarious Work
Migrant labour is articulated as a vital adjunct to the European vision of flexicurity 
and in 2007 the European Union estimated that 20 million non-EU workers were 
needed in order to maintain economic competitiveness (Bilefsky, 2007). However, 
in contrast with the dominant vision of ‘flexicurity’ that is disseminated by European 
government, not everyone is profiting equally from a flexible labour market.  From 
a different perspective, flexibility can be understood as a transfer of vulnerability or 
the risk of doing business from employers to employees.  Thus, as Lawrence (2004: 
1) notes: 
[E]fficient manufacturers and retailers talk of driving costs out of the chain. They 
avoid tiresome forward contracts committing them to specific volumes. Such 
contracts would help suppliers plan their factory rotas, but they also entail a risk 
‘FlexiBilisation’ anD Precarious Working ‘FlexiBilisation’ anD Precarious Working
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of under- or over-supply. Instead, retailers and manufacturers order ‘just in time’ 
from wherever is cheapest around the globe, waiting for their barcode scanning 
to tell them how much consumers are buying. Instant communications allow 
them to relay what they need at a moment’s notice. Modern transport networks 
enable them to have it delivered with unprecedented speed. To survive in this 
brave new world, today’s supplier must leap to in equally short order, so they 
pass the risk down the line to those at the bottom, to labourers who are turned 
on and off like a tap to meet fluctuating demand. And if necessary they must be 
kept hard at it until the orders are finished.
The realities of the precarious conditions that migrant workers face in the labour 
market very directly undermine the ‘flexicurity’ ideal of a mutual interest between 
employers and employees.  Existing as a ‘surplus population’, migrant labour is 
utilised to form ‘short-term, non-binding, sub-contracted workforces which can be 
hired and fired at will and are constantly threatened with replacement…’ (Kundnani, 
2007b: 1).  Indeed, it might be said that the reality of flexibilisation is precisely the 
opposite of that claimed by the idea of flexicurity, for it is the processes that are 
supposed to improve ‘work-life balance’ (longer working hours, exemptions from 
paid leave, irregular wage structure and temporary employment contracts) that 
actually intensify insecurity and precariousness for workers. 
The concept of precarity5 embraces the structural features of an economic insecurity 
that is mediated and reinforced by particular forms of labour commodification 
(i.e. the labour market) on one hand alongside the production of alienation, risk 
of injury and death and other forms of exploitation and inequality experienced 
directly as a consequence of working on the other.  As a concept, it takes account of 
how gendered and racialised inequalities reinforce and are reinforced by particular 
patterns of work.  Put simply, the concept of precarity enables us to understand how 
general (labour market) and particular (labour process) forms of exploitation are 
brought together by flexible working.Undocumented workers are by no means the 
only workers occupying positions of precarity. But as Neilson and Rossiter (2005) 
have suggested, the undocumented migrant is the exemplary precarious worker. 
This point is explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
5 Taken from the French term precarité, the notion of precarity in the context of the labour market 
has been utilised since the 1980s but, according to Neilson and Rossiter (2005) only began to gather 
popularity within Western European countries since the beginning of the 21st Century. As Lima (2006) 
has shown, precariousness is by no means unique to the late 20th Century, but its terminological 
emergence has marked a concerted focus upon attempts to develop analyses of casualisation and 
flexibility as central components of globalisation. 
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In this chapter we explore in more detail how the labour market and the labour 
process structures the precariousness of undocumented or irregular migrants’ 
working lives. The experiences of workers recorded and analysed in this chapter 
provides background on labour market conditions and employment practices that are 
necessary to more fully understand their experience of health and safety conditions 
in the workplace. 
teMPorary Work 
Working as an undocumented worker, as the interview respondents in this study all 
asserted, often means having no contract of employment, and no regular pattern of 
working hours and times. All fourteen respondents emphasised how their working 
lives have been marked by instability and insecurity. A job that provides work for 
more than 6 months is rare, and when work is secured, the hours worked each week 
can differ enormously. The reasons for this vary. But of central importance is the 
structural position that undocumented workers occupy in the labour market.  
Undocumented workers must show their willingness to work as and when required. 
Bekele, for example, worked for an employment agency where they assisted him in 
falsifying a national insurance number to secure employment. Ready to work, he 
was told to turn up at the agency early every morning to see what was available. As 
he explained: 
You just sit in the office till nine in the morning. You go at six in the morning, and 
sit there waiting for a job. They have employers who work with them continuously 
and somebody rings and says ‘I need people’. 
In such a context there was never any guarantee that work would be available. And 
when it was, it would only be for such a time that was required by the employer, 
often to meet upturns in supplier demands. Bekele explained the bluntness of this 
framework and discussed how, for example, one job he had from this agency lasted 
just two days: ‘Then it stopped, they didn’t need people anymore. Maybe they do 
now, I don’t know. When they do, they [the agency] ring and people go’.  
Existing as a ‘just in time’ workforce, in this way undocumented workers provide 
employers with a pliable pool of labour – easily hired and easily fired. Such 
experiences were commonly related by respondents. 
intensity oF Work 
Undocumented working is therefore marked by insecurity and uncertainty.  Hours 
worked may be curtailed when labour is no longer needed, and there may be periods 
when work is simply not available. In periods when work is available, undocumented 
workers are frequently required to work unusually long hours.   
Fabio explained this in detailed terms:  
You work 12, 13 hours [a day] because they know you haven’t got permission… 
Basically they abuse everybody. But still, when you are working they act like they 
are God to you because they know you haven’t got work permission… I work 90 
hours a week, seven days a week and up to 12, 13 hours a day. Well between 80 
and 90 hours a week. No less than 80.  
Similarly, Richard reported that one of his previous jobs had been as a cashier in a 
shop where he worked between twelve and fourteen hours a day: 
I was working every day for two months - 12-14 hours working. And that means 
not having even one hour to rest, to have a break. Because, you know, he doesn’t 
pay tax for the people. It’s good for him. It’s so easy to find a job like that but it’s 
using people. 
Whilst the EU Working Time Directive provides adult workers with entitlement to 
20 minutes break every six hours worked (Trades Union Congress, 2008), for many 
undocumented workers breaks and rests are denied. As Hamad explained, ‘You are 
sometimes not even allowed to have a break for 10 minutes… [I]f it is eight hours, 
you have to do eight exactly’.  Extreme levels of fatigue were commonly reported by 
respondents. Working without a break often means working without any chance to 
stop and eat.  
Respondents reported that working long hours is necessary to compensate for low 
wages. As Fabio reported, ‘I am shattered but I have no choice’. It is to the issue of 
how this lack of choice – central to the exploitation, casualisation, and subordination 
that undocumented workers experience – is reinforced by the manipulation of wages 
that the report now turns. 
PoVerty Wages 
Most respondents reported having worked for ‘cash in hand’ or ‘off the books’. The 
highest wage that anyone reported receiving was minimum wage level or slightly 
above. The lowest was £1.50 per hour. This finding is supported by other studies. 
Ram et al (2002: 23) for example, cite an employer they had interviewed who 
employed both undocumented and documented workers and made clear that he 
employed undocumented workers predominantly for financial reasons, maintaining 
structureD VulneraBility structureD VulneraBility
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that ‘all the rest are paid at the NMW [national minimum wage] rate, if I paid them 
all the same, I might as well not employ illegal workers’.  
Abdul recalled his first labouring job in the UK: 
I was working for somebody and they didn’t give me any money at all...Sometimes 
people are like that. For the first time I came to this country, in London, there 
were three of us and we came back and they didn’t pay.
Hamad also reported that he had been forced to work for no money at all: 
[O]ne week when I was homeless, a week when it was raining and I had nowhere 
to stay, I asked a friend if he knew anybody who could give me some work. 
He introduced me to this one guy who was a builder, he used to go to broken 
houses and repair them. And he said ‘you come work for me’. I told him I had 
nowhere to stay and he said ‘Ok, I will find you a room. You stay a week with 
me’. He found me the room; it was very broken with no light. It was the only 
option though to protect me from the cold and the rain. He said that it was only 
for one week and on the Friday I asked him for my money. He said, ‘sorry I can’t 
give you any money’. So I had been working for him a week and I asked him 
why he couldn’t give me any money. He said ‘you have been staying with me, in 
my accommodation, this is my house. You don’t have any place and it is better 
than anything you have – rain and cold’. Maybe if I had anything he would have 
paid me, maybe £2.50 or something. It was a very hard job, that turned out to 
be digging the roads. So it was hard, but what was I supposed to do? I can’t 
complain, I can’t go to the police, because I am not allowed to do it.  
With no access to welfare benefits there is no safety net for undocumented workers 
and it remains difficult for ‘refused’ asylum seekers to access medical treatment. For 
most of our respondents, being ill is not something that can be afforded. In Bekele’s 
case, he was eventually forced to beg for the money to pay for (private) acupuncture 
to ease the pain stemming from a head injury. 
the threat oF Destitution as a DisciPlinary MechanisM
The destitution that often follows a claim for asylum being refused, quite literally 
forces people into work in order to survive. As Richard explained: 
I have a family and if I have a choice between working illegally or starving my family 
I will work illegal. Whether they catch me or not, I will never let my family starve. 
We apply hundreds of times to get work papers but they always say no. The reason? 
No reason, they just say no.  
Whilst not all undocumented workers have immediate family to support, Richard is 
not alone in having to make a simple choice: break the law by working, or live on 
the streets and starve. He is one of hundreds of thousands of refused asylum seekers 
living in destitution who, as a result, exist as a labour force with no negotiating power 
except that which they collectively muster among themselves and those campaigners 
who offer solidarity and practical support. Taking any work that is available is often 
the only option that is on offer. When asked about what forced him into working 
whilst in the UK, Mike replied: ‘I have an obligation to be alive’. Thandie related a 
period when she was working three separate jobs in order to support her child, to 
raise solicitors fees for assistance with her asylum claim, and to send money home to 
support the rest of her family.  
Amir – a middle-aged man with leg problems that made walking sometimes agonising 
– described how the relative powerlessness in the labour market experienced by 
undocumented workers ensures compliance with exploitative working practices and 
conditions. Speaking of his labouring job, he pointed out:  
They give you harder work. They just give you orders. Do this, do that. And you 
know that it is not your job but you have to do it because if you don’t, you lose 
your job. And then, nothing. You sleep outside again.  
The threat of destitution compounds the relative powerlessness of workers and 
disciplines them into compliance with degrading working conditions.  The fact 
that employers have ‘more workers waiting’ is an integral part of the economy of 
undocumented labour. Indeed, it is this, combined with the stark reality of the 
situation that undocumented workers find themselves in that forces them to acquiesce 
to appalling conditions of work.  
Wage ManiPulation, theFt anD slaVery
With low wages enforced as a common condition of work, employers are empowered 
to make use of a variety of strategies to ensure that their financial costs are reduced 
yet further. The manipulation of wages is integral to the economic spheres in which 
undocumented workers enter.  
Many employees are paid a set amount for a days work as they can then be forced 
to work overtime with no increase in wages. Whilst in turn this can be compounded 
by a series of incremental wage deductions that penalise workers. Richard explained 
one job he had where: 
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[T]he shop owner was very badly treating us. He didn’t pay good. He was using 
us too much, for more than 14 hours a day. It was for £25 and if we were late for 
just half an hour he would take £5 from our wages.
Wage manipulation of this kind can have a devastating impact upon people who 
are paid well below the minimum wage, and exist far beyond the poverty line. 
Yet mechanisms of redress are virtually non-existent and employees are aware 
that complaining may risk dismissal. The consequences of a lack of organised 
representation are reinforced by the fact that there are many others in a similarly 
vulnerable position waiting to take the place of undocumented workers who leave 
their employment. Richard was bold enough to challenge his employer about 
the level of his wages and explained ‘I complained every day but he didn’t care. 
He said “if you want to go then just go. There are a thousand people out there 
wanting this job”’.  
Predicaments such as the one that Richard found himself in are reinforced by policies 
which effectively criminalise undocumented workers for supporting themselves 
through work.  It is the constant risk of detection by the authorities that intensifies 
the vulnerability of workers to arbitrary decisions by their employers.  But it was not 
only in ‘cash in hand’ jobs that such problems arose.  As Bekele reported: 
Well I was owed £600 from the agency [that he was working for]. I was paid 
the week after I worked and one week I had worked six days, and four the week 
after, which was 10 days overall. Also they used to pay holiday money when you 
worked three months straight. I was owed this, about £600. The day before I was 
going to be paid he [the employment agent] rang me to come into the office. In 
those days… he used to have a lot of illegal people. He knew everything really. He 
didn’t really ask for many documents. He gave me a false NI number. So he rang 
me, I used to get a pay slip, and the payslip had already come. He already knew 
I didn’t have real documents. I went there and he looked like he knew nothing 
but he was friendly, he knew me.  They would ring us every night before work, to 
tell us when to start and everything. If he said ‘no you can’t work’, I understand 
that.  Almost 90% of his workers have no papers. I went with three other people 
and my friend went first and he was owed £60 and the boss said he needed proof 
of documents in two weeks time, but he paid him the £60. He called me next 
and said he had checked my documents. The documents, they just photocopy a 
Home Office letter to say you can stay and put in a false name. He said he had 
checked my documents and knew it was not right. He said if I could get the right 
document I could keep my job and get my money. But I was owed £600.  
Bekele has yet to receive any of the money he claims he is owed.  As his asylum 
claim was rejected he was forced into homelessness, and, at the same time, had 
serious health problems. As such, whatever money he earned had to go on medicine, 
rent, and food and as he explained his wages gave him ‘enough to survive, but 
not to live’. 
Employers inculcate a series of wage debts that practically foster slavery among certain 
workers (see the discussions in Pai, 2008).  In this context it is hardly surprising 
that respondents often used the word ‘slavery’ to describe a situation whereby their 
wages paid only provided for bare levels of subsistence.  One respondent, Fabio, 
who had been an undocumented worker in the UK for 6 years, described his plight 
in precisely those terms:  
[W]e are just wasting our time and our lives. I think this is slavery actually, it 
is slavery. The government says it is not but it is… basically they are taking our 
lives, for nothing. So that is slavery. We are working just to eat and survive. 
That’s what we are doing, and that’s what the government is doing to us… This is 
the governments fault. This is slavery. Maybe in the governments’ eyes its not but 
actually that is what they are doing to us. Not just to me, to all of the refugees, 
asylum seekers, all of them. … The government is saying fuck off. 
Notwithstanding the built in reductions in wages for undocumented workers, the 
theft of money from some workers was compounded by the manner in which they 
received wages.  It was reported that some employment agencies would only pay 
money directly into a bank account rather than handing over cash.  However, as a 
result of our respondents’ immigration status, it was not possible for them to open 
a bank account.  The exclusion from normal banking facilities commonly faced by 
undocumented workers compounds their vulnerability to having wages manipulated 
or ‘taxed’ by unscrupulous employment agencies.   
In one reported example of this type of ‘taxing’, Bekele was introduced to a job by 
‘Daniel’ – a man who befriended him and allowed him to use his bank account to 
receive his wages – and whilst he was unsure if Daniel was in some way connected to 
the agency, when he did receive his wages, a sum had been deducted.6 Undocumented 
workers enter a market in which they have very little power relative to employers. 
Employers are empowered by the knowledge that they are more desperate for 
work than other groups of workers and that there is a ready supply of equally 
vulnerable labour. 
6 Pai (2008) also discusses in detail the context within which workers pay upfront to get registered with 
an ‘employment agency’.
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The data from the interviews also revealed how employees were disempowered and 
made structurally vulnerable by their legal status. It is to the exploration of this 
crucial issue that the chapter now turns.   
 
the DisciPlinary PoWer oF legal status 
Whilst the vagaries of the market may be a key reason underpinning the insecurity 
of undocumented work, as stated above, it is not the only reason. As Bekele’s 
experience in the previous section indicated, the legal status (or lack of legal 
status) of undocumented workers is a major factor in the reproduction of their 
vulnerability. In our sample of workers, legal status was acutely important.  All but 
one of the respondents in this research were refused asylum seekers, and a number 
of interviewees were working quite simply to stave off literal destitution. In all 
cases, they were breaking the law by taking up employment. Hamad related this 
predicament: 
If you don’t have the paper, wherever you go you will never get treated the same 
as other people. They will shout at you, scream at you, pushing you to work really 
hard… we never ever complain to anybody. If we [do then] we just get sacked as 
he has more workers waiting. 
For undocumented workers their labour is threatened not only by the whims of 
their employees, but also of being caught by the government and the caution that 
our interviewees consequently exercised was not unfounded. The government has 
funnelled significant resources into preventing undocumented working and in 2007 
the government set out a ‘seven point plan’ to ‘shut down illegal working’ (Home 
Office, 2007: 3) of which a key strand was increased enforcement activities. These 
activities were bolstered, in 2008, by the creation of a ‘watch list’ of immigration 
offenders to be tracked down and local immigration teams were established to assist 
in this process (Home Office, 2008b). One of the implications of this intensified 
immigration control was, for our respondents, a concomitant intensification of the 
risks that were being taken by working without papers.    
With their labour rendered a criminal act, some of the interviewees here could have 
been removed from the country if caught working. For others, as Peter explained, 
taking up employment could lead to financial penalties: 
I myself have been caught twice. The first time they cut some of my NASS 
[National Asylum Support Service]  money. Then you used to get about £38 
a week. It got cut down to about £29. They said it will stay like that till 2015, 
until the money that I had earned had been repaid! That’s what they tried to 
imply [that his claim would not be resolved by this date]… The second time they 
cancelled all my support. Instead of cutting it down, they cut it all completely.7 
Respondents also reported that employers, increasingly nervous about raids by 
enforcement authorities, are quick to use them as a justification for summary 
dismissal. Fabio has lost more than one job without warning when his then employers 
told him that he had to dismiss him quickly, as they suspected they were going to be 
investigated: 
Sometimes I have worked for people for two or three weeks and they haven’t paid 
me and have kicked me out. What can I do? Go fighting? Go make a complaint? 
As he made clear, there was little that could be done to redress this situation 
(a point that we will turn to later). Instead, he was forced to accept that 
he had been made to work for no wages, and look elsewhere. The constant 
threat of immigration raids also disciplines workers in more subtle ways. In 
some cases workers reported that the threat of raids encouraged them to 
keep moving from job to job. Thandie related how she had adopted just such 
a strategy:   
...sometimes you leave a job when you start getting that fear because when you 
are working illegally there is always the fear of ‘what if they catch me?’   At times, 
you have to work and you see maybe three or four people wearing suits and you 
think, ‘oh, what if it is immigration’.  And sometimes there is the gossip as well, 
the grapevine within the workplace, where people say, ‘I think the Home Office, 
blah blah blah’, and in most cases you will quit, to try to be on the safe side. 
Peter discussed how an employment agency that he worked for would threaten to 
reveal the immigration status of those who wanted work, in order to quell any signs 
of dissent at conditions of work. ‘I’ve often heard them threatening people over the 
counter, saying ‘we are going to call immigration for you lot one day’, he explained, 
adding that the subtext was clear: ‘It was a threat – “push your luck and we will 
deal with you”’. 
And as we saw in the previous section, employers used the vulnerability of workers 
quite explicitly to keep wages low.  Hamad’s experiences reinforce this point: 
7 The National Asylum Support Service (NASS) was established through the Immigration and Asylum 
Act 1999 and, effectively, separated asylum support from ‘normal’ welfare entitlements. In 2008, the 
new UK Border Agency incorporated the functions of NASS.
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...the only thing we can find is black jobs, building, chicken and chips or whatever. 
And these people they do not ask for nothing, they treat you really badly, even 
for £2 [per hour].  You can’t ask them for money.  If you ask them two or three 
times, the next day you go, you are fired.  And where do you go? There is nobody 
to look after you.  So you have to keep quiet. 
Complaining, or organising any form of action against mistreatment or work 
conditions is consequently avoided by many of those who cannot risk discovery by the 
authorities. ‘We can’t complain because we are doing a ‘black job’, Amir explained. 
‘We can’t do anything, we don’t want trouble. We had trouble, that’s why we came 
here. We don’t want any more trouble’. And even where employers do not know that 
their staff do not have permission to work any abuse that undocumented workers 
suffer may nonetheless be borne in silence.  
For all of the reasons outlined in this chapter, then, undocumented workers are 
frequently given the worst tasks to do and subordinated within their places of work. 
Or as Joseph put it ‘if they know you haven’t got a paper they treat you different. 
They give you the crap jobs’.  
This report has so far analysed the precarious position of workers in general, and 
has indicated how their working lives are made precarious at the level of the 
labour market and at the level of the workplace.  It has also demonstrated how this 
precariousness is intensified by coercive state practices that are aimed at controlling 
immigration.  The following chapter explores the specific effects of this structural 
vulnerability upon health and safety conditions experienced by workers.
chaPter 3:  
the Violent  
consequences  
of Precarious 
work
the wages of fear: risk, safety and undocumented work
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Most respondents reported very poor health and safety protection in the workplace. 
Some reported a reckless approach to protecting the workforce on the part of 
their employer.  According to Amir this was often a function of working for small 
contractors on a cash-in-hand basis: 
They did nothing.  For health and safety you need money.  You need money first. 
But he hasn’t got money.  He is just doing small contracts.  He hasn’t even got a 
van.
Mohammed noted of his time working in a kitchen ‘my boss cared more about money 
than about people.  Well, more than people with no permission to work’. Whilst 
Hamad, who also worked in a kitchen, said: 
Nobody ever mentions health and safety.  What concerns them is to get the job 
done.  If you get burnt, hurt, they don’t care about that.  They want to do the job 
and you have to do it.  Anything you are told, you have to do it. 
Hamad’s comments on his employer are not untypical of the experience of 
undocumented workers.   
In UK law, employers have responsibilities to ensure the provision and exchange of 
information that enables employees to be properly informed about risks and health 
hazards and to provide appropriate training. 
The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and the Management of Health and Safety 
at Work Regulations 1999, require employers to provide necessary information, 
instruction, training and supervision on health and safety during work time.  The 
law specifies situations where health and safety training is particularly important, for 
example when people start new jobs, or are exposed to new or increased risks.  In law, 
safety training requirements are likely to apply particularly to migrant workers who 
find themselves working in unfamiliar environments.  Yet none of our respondents 
received anything approximating to the type of safety training required by law. 
Three respondents reported some form of communication on safety issues.  One who 
worked in construction reported that he was given safety briefings on a regular basis 
and one reported that he had regular ‘safety talks’ at a factory he worked at.  Another 
respondent reported receiving safety leaflets written in English.   
The Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 1977 and the Health 
and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996 require employers to 
establish mechanisms to consult employees, or their representatives, on health and 
safety issues.  In circumstances where there is no trade union recognition (which was 
the case for all of our respondents), the regulations allow for the company to choose 
Chemical irritation/burn      3
Burn as a result of scalding by water/cooking oil   2
Burn as a result of exposure to oven     1
Crushing       2
Injury as a result of fall      1
Injury as a result of heavy lifiting     1
Cut requiring stiches      1
There is little conclusive evidence that migrant workers are intrinsically more at 
risk of injury and death than other workers. What is known is that migrant work 
tends to be concentrated in sectors that are casualised and, by definition, relatively 
dangerous (Lee and Wrench, 2000; Wrench and Lee, 2002).  And within the most 
dangerous sectors, migrant workers tend to be particularly vulnerable.  One recent 
study showed that migrant workers are at least twice as likely to be killed in the UK 
construction industry (Centre for Corporate Accountability, 2009).  
In the UK employers are universally bound by health and safety law, regardless 
of the status of their workers.  Furthermore the Health and Safety Executive and 
local authority safety enforcement departments are responsible for protecting all 
workers.  In other words, in law there is no distinction made between the regulatory 
protections granted to documented and undocumented workers.   
In practice, however, undocumented workers are much less likely to be aware of 
or benefit from legal provisions put in place to protect them.  As Warshaw (1998: 
24.11) notes:  
The informal or ‘undocumented’ sector includes workers who agree to work 
‘off the books’ – that is, without any formal registration or employer/employee 
arrangement...The employer’s responsibility for informal worker’s health and 
safety is only implicit, at best, and is often denied.  
Risks to the health of undocumented workers are constituted by the precarious 
nature of the labour market and labour process.  It is in this context that we have to 
understand the very high rate of injuries workers are exposed to.  Nine respondents 
reported having been injured (sometimes on multiple occasions) or having been 
made acutely ill by work.  Two respondents who had not been injured themselves 
reported having witnessed a workmate being injured. 
Injuries resulting from work reported in the interviews are set out as follows:
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between a system of consultation through safety reps elected by the workforce or 
a system of direct consultation. Yet none of our respondents reported having been 
involved in any workplace safety consultation mechanism.   
Respondents drew attention to a range of problems in relation to their ability to 
raise safety issues with their employer on a day to day business.  Only two of our 
respondents reported having been able to raise safety issues with their employer 
freely in any of the jobs they had in the UK.  Richard reported:  
We couldn’t open our mouths because the point is we have no right to open our 
mouths.  If we did open our mouths, if we did talk, we would be just asked to 
leave work.  Like I told you, there are thousands waiting outside for our jobs. 
Thousands of people who cannot legally work, they are waiting for a chance to 
get any work. 
Tommy pointed out a rather different dimension to the silencing of undocumented 
workers.  He experienced some racist insults during his work leafleting the streets 
and noted how his ability to defend himself was undermined by his status: ‘You can’t 
say anything because you are not legal.’ 
The only form of consultation was reported by Peter who explained how safety 
concerns were channelled through the agency he worked for, rather than being dealt 
with in the workplace: 
If you are on a building site and something goes wrong, you have to come back 
to the office in the evening to get paid.  Before you get paid, you have to sign this 
sheet where you make all complaints and whatever....Occasionally it worked. 
Sometimes you would get sent back to the same job.  Or sometimes they would 
say ‘if you don’t do it, then we will send someone else.’ There is always someone 
else to take your job. 
Lack of safety equipment was reported by almost all respondents.  The key piece 
of legislation in relation to the use of protective equipment in the workplace is 
the Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations (1992).  In law, personal 
protective equipment should be supplied that is appropriate for the task and for 
the substances to which it is applied.  A failure to comply with those regulations 
was indicated in almost all cases.  Abdul, for example, worked in a freezer storage 
unit and was not provided with any specialist warm clothing.  All of those who 
had worked on building sites and almost all of those who worked in other sectors 
reported that they were expected to provide their own safety equipment.    
Joseph, who worked as a cleaner for a number of agencies reported that protective 
gloves were sometimes provided, but:
It depends on which agency.   Some they don’t bother.  Some they will ask you to 
go clean with no gloves, you go and clean and you clean toilets without gloves. 
Some care, but some don’t.  
For Thandie a lack of protective gloves led directly to severe itching and blistering 
of her skin:  
Well I have been in a situation where I was a kitchen porter and there was this 
detergent that reacted on my skin, whilst I was doing the dishes, it reacted on my 
skin.  I think there was no health and safety there.  We were not advised to wear 
gloves or anything and I had to leave the job just for my own health.  I felt I was 
damaging my hands, so I had to leave the job.  I stayed for a bit but after a few 
weeks I had to leave because it was getting worse and worse.
Many of the injuries reported by respondents were serious enough to require 
immediate medical treatment.   Yet only one worker reported that his employer had 
arranged for medical treatment or transportation to a hospital or doctor.  In this case, 
Peter, who was working in a warehouse loading television sets, cut his finger on a 
glass screen.  He was immediately taken to hospital and the incident was logged in 
his employer’s accident book. 
More often, employers actively discourage the emergency services being called and 
in many cases, workers were simply told to leave the premises when they were 
injured. As Richard noted: 
They can’t.  They will never do it, especially the owner.  Sometimes the owner 
will never be in the shop 24 hours a day, when the owner hears about this stuff 
he will just say, don’t call anyone.  He knows that he’s got illegal men working for 
him so if the police come he will be in trouble.  He will never call the authorities 
because they are not legal.  So he will pay a fine and the worker will go to prison, 
so none of them will want to go to the police, not even the injured person.
Fabio, working in a catering job, reported a serious injury where a fellow worker 
sustained head injuries after falling onto the corner of the table.  His employer did 
not call an ambulance and the worker had to bandage himself and make his own way 
to hospital.  When Fabio was asked if he would ever call the emergency services from 
work following a serious incident, he replied:  
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Well it depends how bad you are.  If you are dying, then you would have no 
choice but to call them. If it’s not an excessive injury, if it’s not a massive injury 
then no because you don’t want to fuck your job. You don’t want anyone to know 
you are working.  
Similarly, Mike noted that emergency services would not be called unless the injury 
was a life-threatening one: 
Even if you get some injury that you keep, you do not inform anybody else because 
you don’t have the right to do that job....Unless someone is unconscious.  You 
would be obliged to announce that to save a life. Otherwise you keep it secret.
Mohammad, working as a kitchen porter, suffered serious scalding when a pan of 
boiling water was spilled over his arm.  He requested that an ambulance be called, 
but his employer refused.  Instead, his fellow workers bandaged his arm.  Mohammed 
couldn’t use his arm for eight weeks afterwards and when he returned to work, his 
employer told him that he had been replaced and could not have his old job back.    
It is common for workers attending hospital to invent a story about their injury to 
prevent anyone finding out it was sustained at work.  According to Richard: 
I know one guy who was working with me in the shop where I was.  A fridge 
freezer fell on his legs and he had no papers, no insurance, no nothing, so they 
just took him down to the hospital, said he was a friend and that he had fallen 
down in the house. 
Respondents reported that both employers and employees would avoid calling 
emergency services to ensure that they would not risk detection by the authorities. 
Several workers reported covering up their own injuries as well as those of fellow 
workers.  Hamad, recalling a serious incident that was not reported, explained:  
I used to work in a chicken and chips place and this guy burned himself, his face 
his body...with oil.  He put some water in the place where you cook chips by 
mistake and it started burning his face, his body.  Now maybe half is face is gone, 
and he can’t do anything. If the doctor asks he will just say he has been cooking. 
In this case, no emergency services were called. Hamad explained why: 
...if you don’t have papers, you can’t call the police, you can’t call an ambulance, 
because they will come to the accident and they will ask you who you are.  If 
the police know who you are then you could get into trouble. Better that you 
get £2 an hour than you are put in prison.  Even if you call an ambulance they 
may investigate, ask what really happened.  So we avoid them, to avoid these 
problems.
Bekele reported an injury sustained by a worker stacking magazines in a warehouse. 
The worker’s finger was severed and, eventually, almost amputated.  His fellow workers 
bandaged him and then drove him to a doctor rather than call an ambulance.  
As previous sections of this report have highlighted, undocumented workers live in 
constant fear of discovery by the authorities.  The fear of discovery combines with an 
awareness that there is no shortage of other workers who are prepared to work for 
low wages and poor conditions to produce acute vulnerability.  The vulnerability of 
their position prevents them from making complaints to their employers about safety 
conditions, and prevents those workers from even contemplating contacting trade 
unions or government authorities such as the Health and Safety Executive in cases 
where they feel they are being made to take unnecessary risks. 
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conclusionconclusion
The working lives of undocumented workers betray the realities of flexible working 
and, for the vast majority of undocumented workers there is little or no option but to 
continue working in exploitative, dangerous, and oppressive conditions. A complex 
set of factors – albeit differing in particular contexts – ensure that vulnerability is 
consolidated. Whilst for others, their immigration status locks them into a form of 
perennial servitude. 
Many ‘refused’ asylum seekers are pushed into a psychological limbo where their 
presence has been criminalised (see Burnett, 2008), but they will not, or cannot, 
return to the country they fled from. And it is these factors which underpin their 
precariousness within the labour market. 
The asylum seekers in this report who work ‘illegally’ risk imprisonment and, 
ultimately, refused asylum seekers risk deportation. These are risks that the 
respondents in this study were well aware of. The fear of being discovered by 
immigration authorities acted as a disciplinary mechanism that reaches into all 
aspects of the labour process: the enforcement of low wages, long working hours 
and poor safety conditions. In stark contrast to government rhetoric about work-
life balances and mutual employment consensuses these are the realties of flexible 
working. 
Flexicurity means the transfer of risks from employers to employees, but not just 
the economic risks normally identified in the literature. The trade-off here is a 
much more human one where economic flexibility is exchanged for increasing the 
physical risks experienced by undocumented workers. Of the fourteen interviewees, 
nine had been seriously injured whilst at work. Others who had not been injured 
had witnessed incidences where their workmates had suffered. 
This study has explored an indeterminate space between health and safety law and 
immigration law which illustrates a basic contradiction at the heart of the state. 
This is a contradiction of law enforcement that ensures legal health and safety 
protections for workers are directly undermined by the enforcement of immigration 
law. The protection of the workforce is compromised by tougher immigration 
enforcement in two ways. 
First, it impacts upon the relationship between workers and employers at the level of 
the workplace. Tougher responses of the state to immigration act to produce a more 
compliant workforce, ever fearful that they risk arrest and deportation. Where this 
fear intensifies, unscrupulous employers are in a strong position to exploit workers 
and drive down standards of working conditions. Indeed, the threat of immigration 
raids makes it less likely that workers will make demands on their employers 
conclusion
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for safe working practices and the provision of safety training. Second, risks to 
workers are created because immigration raids, rather than health and safety raids 
constitute the greatest threat to the existence of a firm employing undocumented 
workers. The UK Health and Safety Executive is woefully overstretched as it is, 
and for almost a decade now has faced intensified political attacks upon its ability 
to enforce the law in the ‘regular’ sectors (Tombs and Whyte, 2008). The task of 
protecting undocumented workers is one that is currently way beyond its means. It 
is therefore not the Health and Safety Executive but the UK Border Agency that the 
most exploitative employers fear. Under such conditions, securing compliance with 
universal health and safety legislation is barely feasible. 
In a grotesque twist of the idea that flexibilisation can satisfy the mutual interests 
of employers and employees, some respondents reported that they needed to be 
constantly on the move between jobs, to avoid discovery by the authorities and its 
consequences (at best the loss of their livelihood and at worst, deportation). The 
desire for flexibilisation in our sample is therefore not born out of a desire for a 
particular type of lifestyle, and is not a consequence of the free choice of workers, but 
is a result of the ever present threat of state violence. Flexibilisation in this context 
can only be understood as a process that results from the structural degradation 
of working conditions on the one hand, and the violence of immigration control 
strategies on the other. 
The vulnerability of undocumented workers is structured by a combination 
of government policies on labour market regulation and border control. As we 
have seen, this political combination has brutal consequences for undocumented 
workers: there can be no doubt that systematic disregard for basic safety rights has 
exposed workers to unbearably high thresholds of risk of injury and death; and 
often severe injuries are hidden by employers and by workers themselves to the 
point that emergency treatment is eschewed for fear of discovery. 
This pattern of structural subordination cannot be simply understood, as the 
government would have it, as a consequence of rogue employers who tarnish the 
reputation of the majority of responsible businesses (Home Office, 2008c). Neither 
can it be blamed upon language difficulties or cultural differences (Anderson 
and Rogaly, 2005). And it certainly cannot be blamed upon the choices made by 
irregular migrants themselves. Undocumented workers are injured and killed by 
intensified working conditions, conditions that are re-enforced by a lack of legal 
protections. 
It is the political strategy followed by state institutions that ensures those legal 
protections are not upheld and in turn are systematically undermined by this brutal 
combination of labour market and immigration policy. We cannot know whether 
conclusion conclusion
the consequences of this policy are intended or unintended by its architects. But 
this report has begun to show how the origins of the violent subordination and 
victimisation of this section of the workforce can be found in the careful planning 
and execution of government policy.
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Undocumented work is, by definition, illegal work. As a result research access to 
this population is extremely difficult and the subject matter tackled by this report, 
highly sensitive. All of the respondents were selected through contacts developed 
through PAFRAS. Every one of the respondents, at the time of interview, was seeking 
asylum but their claim had been rejected. Some had submitted fresh evidence in 
support of their claim. As a result, the interviewees did not make up a wholly 
representative sample of undocumented workers (many undocumented workers are 
not seeking asylum). The research sample, however, was underpinned by the highly 
sensitive nature of the research questions, and the availability of interviewees. All 
of the respondents were living in the North of England at the time of interview. 
The fourteen respondents for this report were all interviewed between June and 
September 2008. As Table 1 below shows, all of them were either in employment 
at the time of interview, or have worked previously whilst in the UK without legal 
permission to do so. 
The interviews all lasted between 30-60 minutes and were semi-structured around 
an interview schedule. The interviewees were asked to sign a consent form before the 
interview, after the purpose of the research was explained in detail. All interviewees 
were assured that their names and the names of any of their employers would not 
be mentioned. All of the interviews were conducted on the premises of an asylum 
support agency.  Interviewees were also asked to adopt a pseudonym for the purposes 
of this research. Interviews were recorded on audio tape and interviewees were told 
that they could stop the interview at any point, or refuse to answer any question if 
they chose to do so.    
All of the interviewees had reached a negative decision on their asylum claim but 
different interviewees were in receipt of varying entitlements. All of the respondents, 
when working, were either awaiting a decision on their asylum claim, in receipt 
of ‘Section 4’ support,8  or were left completely without support. One respondent 
stopped working when he began to receive support from his local authority.9  
aPPenDix 1: saMPle anD MethoDs
8 Section 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 refers to temporary support available to ‘refused’ 
asylum seekers who are destitute but fulfil one of the following criteria of agreeing to leave the UK 
‘voluntarily’, cannot be returned due to medical reasons, have made an application for a judicial review 
of their case, or must be provided with accommodation in order to avoid a breach of their Convention 
Rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998. Single recipients of Section 4 support normally 
receive £35.39 per week which can be spent through an ‘Azure’ payment card. These cards can only be 
used in certain supermarkets and retail shops. For discussion of Section 4 support, see Burnett (2007). 
At all stages of the asylum process people do not have permission to take up employment. 9 Under S. 21 
of the National Assistance Act 1948 an individual who has no recourse to public funds can be assessed 
by their local authority, in order to establish whether they are classed as ‘destitute plus’ (i.e are at risk of 
significant harm if accommodation is not provided). Local authority support provides accommodation 
and financial support. 
BiBliograPhy aPPenDix
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the wages of fear: risk, safety and undocumented work
